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A Baldrige Process for Ethics?
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ABSTRACT: In this paper we describe and explore a management tool called the SelfAssessment and Improvement Process (SAIP). Based upon the Caux Round Table
Principles for Business – a stakeholder-based, transcultural statement of business values
– the SAIP assists executives with the task of shaping their firm’s conscience through an
organizational self-appraisal process. This process is modeled after the self-assessment
methodology pioneered by the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award Program.
After briefly describing the SAIP, we address three topics. First, we examine
similarities and differences between the Baldrige approach to corporate self-assessment
and the self-assessment process utilized within the SAIP. Second, we report initial
findings from two beta tests of the tool. These illustrate both the SAIP’s ability to help
organizations strengthen their commitment to ethically responsible conduct, and some of
the tool’s limitations. Third, we briefly analyze various dimensions of the business
scandals of 2001-2002 (Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, etc.) in light of the ethical requirements
articulated with the SAIP. This analysis suggests that the SAIP can help link the current
concerns of stakeholders – for example, investors and the general public – to
organizational practice, by providing companies with a practical way to incorporate
critical lessons from these unfortunate events.
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“As an organization acquires a self, a distinctive identity, it becomes an institution. This
involves the taking on of values, ways of acting and believing that are deemed important
for their own sake. From then on self-maintenance becomes more than bare
organizational survival; it becomes a struggle to preserve the uniqueness of the group in
the face of new problems and altered circumstances.”
– Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration1

Introduction: Preventing the Collapse of Towers
For Americans, everything seemed to change in the fall of 2001. Why? In part at least,
because our country was living in illusion, not unlike the prisoners in Plato’s Allegory of
the Cave. We were shocked on September 11 to discover that there were realities in our
world far different from the shadows cast on our walls. Realities that threatened not only
individual lives – but our entire way of life.
The Enron/Arthur Andersen scandal, which we can date from October and
November of 2001, also revealed that we Americans were living in an illusion, only this
time an illusion related to shadowy financial reporting – misrepresentation to concerned
parties (employees, shareholders, etc.) of the realities on which their financial security
was based.
The collapse of the financial towers of Enron and Andersen is parallel to the
collapse of the World Trade Center towers – both revealed our vulnerability in the face of
certain kinds of fanaticism. And both called forth from American public institutions an
aggressive response. In the case of 9/11, it was Afghanistan and eventually Iraq. In the
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case of Enron and Andersen (and WorldCom and Tyco and Adelphia and many others), it
was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the US Department of Justice.
Many have remarked about the limitations of law when it comes to effecting
changes in corporate cultures. Laws can change behavior by adjusting incentives and
sanctions for those covered by them, but laws have a difficult time reaching basic ethical
values – what we might call corporate consciences.
Why? Because the essence of corporate conscience is not in the end a matter of
external compliance; it is a matter of internal self-assessment and improvement. It is a
matter of what we as persons and corporations as organizations stand for.
Discussing the collapse of Enron, Warren Bennis, Professor of Management at the
University of Southern California, wrote in the New York Times that
Mr. Lay’s failing is not simply his myopia or cupidity or incompetence. It is his
inability to create a company culture open to reality, one that does not discourage
managers from delivering bad news. No organization can be honest with the
public if it is not honest with itself.2
There are three key imperatives for leaders who would avoid Mr. Lay’s legacy and create
or maintain an organizational conscience: (i) orienting, (ii) institutionalizing, and (iii)
sustaining ethical values.3 These imperatives deal with placing and maintaining moral
considerations in a position of authority alongside considerations of profitability and
competitive strategy in the corporate mindset.
Orienting is about guiding the group toward a shared vision and a shared set of
values to achieve it. The objective is to discern the dominant ethical values of the
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company and to subject them to critical scrutiny. Then a decision is made either to
maintain those values or to adjust them as the company moves forward.
Once corporate leadership has clarified the direction it wants to take, the process
of institutionalizing becomes paramount. How can the company’s shared ethical values
be made part of the operating consciousness of the company? How can they gain the
attention and the allegiance of middle management and other employees? (a)
Sustaining ethical values has to do with passing on the spirit of this effort to
future leaders of the organization and to the social system as a whole.
While these imperatives fall within the purview of company leaders, they are of
direct concern to all members of the firm. Leaders who successfully address these tasks
engender an organizational culture that supports and propagates ethical conduct. Such a
culture promotes the moral flourishing of individual employees as they pursue their
professional vocations – for example, enabling engineers to act with both technical
proficiency and moral integrity.
Perhaps the most difficult of these three imperatives is the second. As most
engineers can appreciate, institutionalizing an ideal, or rendering it operational, calls for
a thorough understanding of current practices, along with the ability to articulate and
measure the degree to which current practices fall short of aspirations.

Ethics as a Business Imperative
Why should corporate leaders concern themselves with institutionalizing corporate
conscience? Certainly the scandals at Enron and Andersen have heightened awareness of
the need for ethical business conduct. At a minimum, they have led to a clearer
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recognition of the concrete misfortunes unethical behavior can bring. Not the least of
these misfortunes is a tarnished corporate reputation, which can impair a company’s
long-term sustainability to the detriment of all its stakeholders. A number of studies
suggest the vital role corporate reputation plays in the eyes of customers and investors.
The Millennium Poll on Corporate Social Responsibility – a 1999 survey conducted with
25,000 individuals in 23 countries – revealed that one in five consumers had either
rewarded or punished companies in the previous year based on their perceived social
performance.4 A 2001 study by the public relations firm Hill and Knowlton found that
nearly 80% of Americans consider reputation when buying a company’s product.5 The
Hill and Knowlton study also showed that more than 70% of investors consider
reputation when purchasing stocks. The 2002 PricewaterhouseCoopers Sustainability
Survey Report noted that
[t]he mantra in today’s business world is honesty in accounting, a natural and
appropriate response to the scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and a growing list of top
tier U.S. companies. Tomorrow, however, we will be expected to go a giant step
further – creating corporations that are sustainable, as well as
accountable…[C]ompanies that fail to become sustainable – that ignore the risks
associated with ethics, governance, and the “triple bottom line” of economic,
environmental, and social issues – are courting disaster. In today’s world of immense
and instant market reaction, an action or inaction that undermines the integrity, ethics,
or reputation of a company can lead to immediate and dire financial consequences.6
The results of the 2002 Sustainability Survey indicate that senior executives are
beginning to recognize the connection between ethical behavior and corporate viability.

6
Ninety percent of those surveyed indicated that their company had adopted “sustainable
practices” – defined as a “business approach to create long-term shareholder value by
embracing opportunities and managing risks deriving from economic, environmental, and
social developments” – in order to enhance corporate reputation. Seventy-five percent
indicated that they had done so as a way of developing a competitive advantage.
Customer demand, revenue growth, shareholder demand, and access to capital also
figured prominently in responses (see Exhibit 1).
Studies such as these support the conviction that institutionalizing corporate
conscience is increasingly a mandatory task for senior leaders. A failure to integrate
ethical values into decisions and actions taken at all levels of an organization potentially
puts the entire enterprise at risk, jeopardizing relationships with stakeholders whose
cooperation is required for long-term business success.

From Aspirations to Operational Assessments and Improvements
The Caux Round Table Principles for Business were officially launched in July 1994.
They emerged from discussions among Japanese, European, and American executives,
and were fashioned in part from a document called the Minnesota Principles.(b) The
Caux Principles articulate a comprehensive set of ethical norms that could be embraced
by a business operating internationally in diverse cultural environments. For this reason,
the framers of the Caux Principles had to formulate them so that both Eastern and
Western mindsets could find them intelligible and acceptable.
The Caux Principles rest upon two basic ethical ideals – human dignity and the
Japanese concept of kyosei. The former values each person as an end and implies that
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one’s worth can never can be reduced to his or her utility as a means to someone else’s
purpose. The ideal of kyosei was defined by Ryuzaburo Kaku, the late chairman of
Canon, Inc., as “living and working together for the good of all.”7 Kyosei is a concept that
tempers individual, organizational, and even national self-interest with concern for more
embracing “common goods.”8
The Caux Principles express these two ideals in a format that progresses toward
greater specificity. The document’s Preamble establishes the vital need for corporate
conscience in the modern business world. Then follow seven General Principles which
clarify how the values of human dignity and kyosei inform business practice within a
global context. The third and final section of the Caux Principles utilizes a stakeholder
framework to supplement the general norms with more specific guidelines. These
Stakeholder Principles specify how the ideals of human dignity and kyosei engage a
company’s relationships with customers, employees, investors, suppliers, competitors,
and communities.
The Caux Principles help define the phrase “principled business leadership.”
Their progressive articulation continues with the Self-Assessment and Improvement
Process (SAIP), which facilitates a more direct assessment of the fit between the
Principles and a company’s operations (see Figure 1).(c) The SAIP enables managers to
identify behavior inconsistent with the Principles, detect current and emerging corporate
responsibility concerns, and launch targeted improvement initiatives. It equips senior
executives to address the growing expectation of responsible business conduct through a
confidential, systematic self-appraisal.
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Applying the SAIP is a multi-stage process, involving data collection, scoring,
feedback, and action. The process is company-led and company-controlled. It also is
company-confidential, at least during the early stages of its application. There is
extensive process documentation to accompany the SAIP, and the tool may be applied to
corporations either in toto or in part (e.g., certain divisions or business units).(d)
The SAIP is structured around the Caux Principles. A company’s performance
against each of the seven General Principles is evaluated from seven distinct
perspectives: How well the firm has fulfilled the fundamental duties that flow from a
principle, and how well it has realized the aspirations articulated by that principle in its
relations with six stakeholder groups. The result is a 7-by-7 matrix of assessment criteria
(see Figure 2).
To illustrate the use of the SAIP, let us consider a company’s self-assessment
regarding the general principle “Business Behavior” and a specific stakeholder group,
owners and investors. To perform this appraisal, the company must reflect upon the
assessment criterion contained in cell 3.4, which addresses the challenge of developing
trust with shareholders through truthfulness and transparency. Criterion 3.4 is shown in
Exhibit 2, together with some of the specific questions (“benchmarks”) that amplify and
elaborate it. For example, the benchmarks require the company to consider its established
policies and practices for responding to shareholder inquiries, the way it addresses the
issue of revealing foreseeable material risks, and the process it uses to ensure that
auditors render an independent judgment on its financial statements. In short, criterion
3.4 and its benchmarks prompt a company to evaluate its standards for disclosures to
shareholders, and the processes it employs to ensure these standards are consistently met.
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The SAIP identifies the maximum possible score a company can receive for its
performance against these interrogatories. By comparing its responses against a set of
quantification guidelines, the firm can generate a score that characterizes its current
performance level for each cell of the assessment matrix. By totaling the scores for all
forty-nine cells, the company can generate an overall indication of its performance
against the requirements of the Caux Principles for Business.
The scoring process highlights areas where company performance is relatively
strong or weak. This information can help the organization formulate initiatives intended
to improve the company’s conduct. In addition, sharing this information with critical
stakeholders can improve the company’s credibility.
What results might a company hope for from the SAIP? At a minimum, it means
that company performance is being evaluated against a global standard for ethical
business conduct. In the process, it also serves as an assessment of compliance for US
companies bound by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The SAIP helps to identify
company strengths and to detect problems and emerging issues (an “early warning
system”). It also clarifies improvement opportunities based on systematic, credible data.
As to rewards, the SAIP promises several: (a) improved management awareness
and control; (b) enhanced congruence between stated values and behavior; (c) reduced
risk of noncompliance; (d) improved communication and credibility with multiple
stakeholders; (e) increased likelihood of positive evaluations from third-party monitoring
organizations (for example, non-governmental organizations and socially responsible
investment funds); (f) enhanced reputation among peer companies; and (g) improved
revenues and profits.
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Building on Baldrige – A Second Pillar
The authors have developed the SAIP for measuring the degree to which an organization
has institutionalized its ethical values. We have seen that the SAIP rests upon the Caux
Round Table Principles as a kind of pillar. But there is a second pillar of equal
importance. The SAIP utilizes the concepts behind the Malcolm Baldrige National
Quality Program. The Program has had a profound impact on American businesses. Its
success in revolutionizing American industry led to the Program’s extension into
education and healthcare, where it is exerting a similar positive influence. The inventors
of the SAIP have attempted to build on this legacy by applying the Baldrige selfassessment model within the arena of business ethics.
The Baldrige Criteria for Performance Excellence have been described as a large
open-book test on business management – “Everything you’ve always wanted to know
about business management, but didn’t have time to ask.” They serve as:
•

a focused business excellence model;

•

a realistic basis for self-assessment;

•

a comprehensive communications vehicle;

•

a mechanism for continual improvement; and

•

a framework for learning.

Consistently applied, the Baldrige Criteria provide a model for assessing the current state
of business performance and a roadmap to performance excellence.
Similarly, the SAIP can be viewed as a large open-book test on business ethics,
encompassing all the corporate social responsibility questions business leaders now feel
compelled to ask – a kind of corporate examination of conscience. The goal of the SAIP
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is an ethical reengineering of the corporation in the same sense that the Baldrige Criteria
helped reengineer corporate performance.

Comparison of the Baldrige Model and the SAIP
Principles. Both the SAIP and the Baldrige Criteria are non-intrusive and aspirational.
They focus on common results rather than common procedures. For example, the SAIP
does not specify the exact methods, procedures, or processes that should be used to assure
a culture of trust, as these may well depend upon business and organizational specifics.
However, the SAIP and the Baldrige Program both articulate a set of foundational beliefs
and behaviors that are characteristic of exemplary organizations. In the case of the SAIP,
these are the Caux Round Table Principles; the Baldrige refers to them as core values
(see Exhibit 3).
Measurement. An important feature of the SAIP is its introduction of
measurement and quantification into the ethics conversation. Specifically, it quantifies
the degree to which a culture of trust has been institutionalized in an organization. The
scoring system, based on 1000 points, evaluates approach, deployment, and results. In the
Baldrige Program, companies are similarly evaluated on a 1000-point scale. Leading
Baldrige companies score approximately 700 points; no company has ever approached
1000 points. Although a data base has yet to be built, an SAIP score of 700 points might
represent “best in class.” It should be noted that a score of less that 1000 points would not
imply that an organization is unethical, but rather that a culture of trust has yet to be
completely institutionalized throughout the organization – a possible but daunting
achievement.
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SAIP assessment is done by a unique consensus process. Consensus is a powerful
win-win process which is somewhat difficult to understand. We learn at an early age that
we get our way through the power of persuasion, with the objective of winning over our
opponent. This win-lose system stresses articulation over understanding. It frequently
leads to gridlock. To break the gridlock, we resort to compromise. In a compromise,
neither side completely achieves its objectives and a lose-lose situation results.
The consensus process requires that all team members agree with and support the
decisions made. This is critical in a field such as ethics, which has “degrees of goodness.”
We would probably all agree, for example, that employers should pay a fair wage, but
what constitutes a fair wage might be a subject for considerable discussion. The
consensus process drives that discussion to a conclusion with which everyone can agree.
Frequently, consensus decisions require some generalization in order to reach agreement.
Such generalizations uncover areas where more research is needed and hence motivate
further learning.
Differences. The inventors patterned the SAIP after the Baldrige assessment process
in order to leverage the power of the Baldrige model. At the same time, they recognized
that there are some fundamental differences between a performance excellence system
and an ethics assessment. The inventors recognized three significant differences and
designed the SAIP to accommodate those differences. They are:
1. An organization’s ethics assessment is likely to be regarded as more proprietary
than its performance excellence system. All of the Baldrige Award winners have
had their performance excellence systems evaluated by teams of external
examiners. While the examiners themselves are pledged not to divulge any
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information about the organizations they assess, the Baldrige Award winners
themselves have been very generous in sharing their knowledge and practices in a
public manner. Organizations may not be as willing to expose or share their ethics
assessments. The SAIP scoring will largely be done internally by members of the
organization. Accordingly, the inventors have tailored the scoring system to
facilitate organizational learning rather than scoring precision.
2. Ethics results are likely to be more difficult to quantify than other business
results. Any Baldrige application contains several pages of graphs showing
performance levels, trends, targets and benchmarks. Earnings per share and
similar business results are stated as exact numbers and are regarded as more
precise than perhaps they really are. While some ethics results are quantifiable –
e.g., health- and safety-related incidents – many will not be. The question then
becomes, “What constitutes evidence in the SAIP?” To help resolve this problem,
the inventors have accepted other kinds of data as empirical indicators of
responsible conduct – for example, public recognition. Public recognition would
include awards for outstanding community citizenship, positive reviews by rating
agencies, and similar acknowledgments of exemplary behavior.
3. The SAIP is designed around a discrete set of principles and stakeholders, while
the Baldrige process is an integrated system for business performance. In
accommodating this difference, the inventors incorporated a subtle change in
scoring methodology. The Baldrige assessment contains seven evaluation
categories, six of which are scored on approach and deployment. Category 7
reports the results which derive from the approaches deployed in the first six
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categories. By contrast, the SAIP (in its unabridged form) evaluates approach,
deployment, and results for each of the 49 cells within the assessment matrix.
This assures that there is actual verification of an organization’s progress in
institutionalizing a culture of responsible conduct and trust.

Beta Test Lessons
If the SAIP is to effectively shape and institutionalize corporate conscience, it must be
easily employed by companies. To assess how well the SAIP fares against this
requirement, beta tests of the tool have been initiated at two firms. The first test began in
mid-2002; the second was launched in early 2003.
Both beta test companies are privately held. In both cases, the firm’s participation
in the beta test process was instigated by its chief executive officer, who viewed the SAIP
as an opportunity to evaluate and strengthen the organization’s commitment to
responsible conduct. Both chief executives also have played a critical role in the tool’s
implementation. However, similarities between the companies end there. The two
organizations participate in different sectors of the economy: One is an energy company
that produces a range of refined fuels and lubricants for the domestic U.S. market, while
the other is a U.S.-based firm that provides consulting services to schools, communities,
and public agencies primarily located within the developing world. The energy firm
recorded revenues in excess of $130 million in 2001. It employs roughly 300 individuals,
with most working at a single site. The consulting operation is little more than onequarter the size of its beta test counterpart, recording 2001 revenues of $35 million. Its
200 employees are located in 12 countries.
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As of June 2003, the beta tests remained in progress. However, the results to that
point led to three preliminary conclusions about the SAIP’s usefulness and effectiveness.
In turn, these conclusions have influenced the tool’s ongoing development.
Lesson 1: Implementation of the SAIP is time- and labor-intensive. The
version of the SAIP used in the beta tests contains 275 benchmarks. Both companies
faced the challenge of responding to all of these benchmarks, and then scoring each
individual response. For small- to medium-sized organizations, which typically face tight
staffing constraints, such a task can be overwhelming. This is particularly true if the firm
must simultaneously confront other challenges, for example, weathering an economic
downturn, investigating a potential acquisition, or undertaking a critical, highly visible
consulting engagement – actual situations encountered by our two pilot companies. The
practical effect of undertaking the SAIP within such an environment was to further tax
already heavily burdened employees. Consequently, both organizations were compelled
to revise their original timetable for implementing the SAIP.
The SAIP’s inventors discussed a streamlined version of the tool about a year
prior to inaugurating the first beta test. The experiences of the two beta test companies
decisively confirmed the need for such a design. Efforts to develop an abridged SAIP
have led to two important products: a set of “gateway” assessment criteria, and an
implementation model that recognizes a spectrum of ways to utilize the SAIP.
To understand the gateway criteria, one must recall that in the most detailed
version of the SAIP each criterion is associated with an average of five to six
benchmarks. The benchmarks explicate the criterion by further detailing its requirements.
They inject a degree of specificity into the self-assessment process that helps guard
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against vague or overly general responses. But this specificity comes at a price, namely,
the time that must be invested to develop and evaluate detailed replies. The gateway
criteria limit the time necessary to perform the self-assessment by capturing within a
single query much of the content expressed by the benchmarks. Use of the gateway
criteria compels a company to consider this critical content, while reducing the number of
responses it must formulate and score from 275 to 49.
Early in the SAIP’s development, its inventors recognized the flexibility latent in the
tool. The drafting of the gateway criteria, however, enabled them to better articulate the
range of implementation options available to users of the tool. Figure 3 illustrates three
different levels or stages at which a company could engage the SAIP. These stages are
distinguished by several factors, including:
•

who is performing the assessment;

•

the criteria employed within the assessment process;

•

the performance dimensions that serve as the assessment’s primary focus;

•

the length of time necessary to complete the assessment;

•

the expected outcomes.

The Stage I assessment represents the most rudimentary application of the SAIP. At
this stage, the assessment is performed by the CEO and/or the company’s board of
directors. A version of the tool called the SAIP Executive and Board Survey is used. The
Executive and Board Survey employs the gateway criteria. However, at this stage the
self-assessment is limited to a single performance dimension: it asks executives to
evaluate the approach taken by their company to each of the 49 criteria (see Exhibit 4).
The Executive and Board Survey is designed to be completed in approximately 90
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minutes. Assessors are not required to collect data as part of the Stage I appraisal; rather,
they are asked to assign a score based on their present understanding of the firm’s
operations. Hence, the outcome at this level is “systematic speculation” about how the
organization addresses critical ethical aspirations. Such speculation is obviously
imprecise, but the process of working through the Survey generates greater awareness of
corporate responsibility issues. In short, the Stage I assessment raises questions which
prompt chief executives and board members to undertake a more detailed evaluation of
company’s practices.
Stage II employs a version of the SAIP called the Senior Management Survey.
The requirements of the Stage II assessment differ from those of Stage I in four ways.
First, more perspectives are engaged in Stage II: As suggested by its name, the Senior
Management Survey is designed to be completed by the organization’s chief operating
officer and his or her leadership team. Ideally, this would take place in a working session
of four to eight hours. Second, while the gateway criteria are utilized in Stage II, a second
performance dimension is introduced. That is, the assessors must consider not only the
approach the company takes to each criterion, but also deployment, that is, the extent to
which the approach is utilized across the company’s various divisions, functions, or
subsidiaries (see Exhibit 5). Third, data is introduced in Stage II to confirm (or refute)
the assessors’ perceptions of the company’s corporate responsibility efforts. Evidence
that typically would be considered includes statements of corporate values, documented
policies and practices, procedural statements, and other forms of written guidance.
Fourth, the outcomes in Stage II move beyond enhanced awareness towards more
tangible benefits. For example, the company receives an initial score for its efforts on a
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1000-point scale. It also preliminarily identifies improvement opportunities that might be
addressed by specific programmatic initiatives.
At Stage III the company encounters the complete or (“long-form”) version of the
SAIP. The most important difference between Stage II and Stage III is that in the latter a
company utilizes the unabridged assessment criteria – including the 275 explanatory
benchmarks – rather than the gateway criteria. The growth in the assessment task is
accompanied by a corresponding expansion of the time required to complete the selfappraisal. Depending upon their circumstances, companies can expect to take between
three and twelve months to complete the process. Furthermore, the self-assessment in
Stage III touches upon results as well as approach and deployment (see Exhibit 2). Thus,
the data the assessors must consider will extend beyond statements of policy and practice
to actual outcomes of the company’s corporate responsibility efforts, both qualitative and
quantitative. The outcomes at Stage III include a score on a 1000-point scale, an
identified set of improvement opportunities, and (most importantly) a detailed plan to
address these opportunities through specific initiatives and actions. Thus, the ultimate
result at Stage III is an enhancement of the company’s performance, a consequence of
implementing actions suggested by the SAIP’s outcomes.
Lesson 2: Full implementation of the SAIP requires more than just collecting
data, developing responses to benchmarks, and scoring these responses. It requires
the organization’s leadership to reflect on these outcomes and accurately judge their
implications. Thus, dialogue and discernment play a vital role in the application of the
SAIP. They catalyze the process by which outcomes from its self-assessment segment are
translated into actions that advance the institutionalization of corporate conscience. At
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best, a failure to subject the self-assessment’s outcomes to discussion and managerial
judgment amounts to a missed opportunity. On this point, the comments of the chief
financial officer of a beta test company are instructive. At an informal mid-course review
of the company’s implementation efforts, this executive observed that
[a] lack of dialogue between senior leaders – the opportunity to compare how I
would have responded to a benchmark to how others would have replied –
prevented us from forming a collective understanding of the results. In short, it
prevented us from drawing more and better fruit from a process in which we had
invested significant time and effort.(e)
At worst, a failure to engage in this activity undermines the SAIP’s purpose.
Mechanically applying the results of self-assessment, without subjecting them to the
demands of prudence – understood not as narrow self-interest, but as the capacity to
judge the best way to achieve the moral good within a set of concrete circumstances –
reduces the SAIP to a surrogate for ethical decision-making within the organization. In
short, this misapplication turns the tool into a substitute for corporate ethical reflection.
The SAIP is intended to assist, not replace, the ethical deliberation of executives. It is
designed to facilitate the institutionalization of corporate conscience, not its outsourcing.

Lesson 3: The SAIP’s criteria and benchmarks are useful not only for designing
programmatic initiatives intended to strengthen corporate conscience, but also for
shaping strategic decisions. This point was underscored by the experience of the energy
company during its beta test. Immediately after completing the data collection stage of
the SAIP, the firm confronted the opportunity to acquire a valuable piece of technology.
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The acquisition would take place through the purchase of a second refinery. Buying the
refinery would necessitate rationalizing operations across both sites, as the technology in
question could not be relocated to the company’s original production facility. A likely
outcome of this action would be the layoff of approximately 20 to 30 employees.
However, the company’s CEO challenged his staff to address this task differently
– that is, “without the loss of a single job.” The decision to issue this challenge resulted
from his review of SAIP criteria and benchmarks relevant to the company’s situation.
While the SAIP does not mandate a “no-layoff policy,” the chief executive’s approach to
this decision illustrates an important point: The assessment questions contained within
the SAIP can help to illuminate ethical dimensions of the strategic decisions facing a
company. By highlighting these dimensions, the criteria and benchmarks help decision
makers identify the ethical implications of the various options they may be considering –
implications that otherwise might have been overlooked. The recognition of these ethical
dimensions offers executives a chance to better shape their decisions to honor the
legitimate moral claims of the individuals and groups affected by them.

Conclusion
In this paper, we began with a reflection on the collapse of towers – both the World Trade
Center towers and the Enron-Andersen towers. Restoring the damages associated with
these collapses will take time and enormous effort. In the case of the Enron-Andersen
restoration, the economic confidence of a whole society is at stake, and it is imperative
that concrete measures be taken to assure not only legal compliance in the future, but
something deeper: corporate conscience. In our opinion, the SAIP, built as it is on the
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pillars of the Caux Principles and the Baldrige Process, offers a pathway to the
restoration that we seek. It represents a comprehensive, tested measure of the degree to
which a company has institutionalized fundamental ethical values. Charles M. Denny,
former CEO of ADC Telecommunications, Inc., summarized the matter eloquently:
The only way a director can totally understand the behavior of a company
is to shake it from top to bottom, by means of a thorough and systematic
assessment like the SAIP. Performing just such an assessment is critical if
directors are to assure themselves that the company for which they are
responsible is performing as they believe it should.9
No tool, including the SAIP, can guarantee responsible corporate conduct. But it seems
reasonable to suggest that honest, forthright application of the SAIP could help to
uncover behavior and tendencies like those which undermined Enron, Andersen, and
other companies. It would be difficult to respond with honesty and integrity to the
questions in Exhibit 2 (Cell 3.4 of the SAIP) about financial disclosure, auditing,
material risk factors, and auditor objectivity while still engaging in the behaviors that
gave rise to the scandals.
The pursuit of corporate conscience suggests that engineering and ethics perhaps
have more to offer each other than one may have thought. The Hungarian engineer
Theodore von Karman purportedly said, “Scientists discover the world that exists;
engineers create the world that never was.” To which we could add, “ethicists seek the
world that ought to be.” At graduation ceremonies each year, engineering students at the
University of St. Thomas recite the “Obligation of the Engineer,” an adaptation of the
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“Faith of the Engineer” prepared by the Engineers’ Council for Professional
Development. In part, it says:
As an engineer, I pledge to practice integrity and fair dealing, tolerance
and respect, and to uphold devotion to the standards and the dignity of my
profession, conscious always that my skill carries with it the obligation to
serve humanity by making best use of Earth’s precious wealth.
The fulfillment of this pledge depends not just on the moral character of the individual
engineer, but also the moral climate of the organization wherein he or she practices. In
short, a robust corporate conscience helps create an organizational context that enables
engineers to employ their technical skill with moral integrity.
Conversely, if scientists seek to understand what is and ethicists seek what ought
to be, then engineers – by showing how to create a world that never was – can help build
a bridge from the former to the latter. We believe the Self-Assessment and Improvement
Process is an example of such a bridge, a tool that uses the quality engineering concepts
behind the Baldrige Process to foster corporate cultures supportive of behaviors which
“ought to be.” Should we not expect corporate executives and boards of directors to
create such cultures? We think so.
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Exhibit 1.

Top Ten Reasons Companies are
Becoming More Socially Responsible.
90%

Enhanced Reputation
Competitive advantages

75%

Cost savings

73%

Industry trends

62%

CEO/Board commitment

58%

Customer demand

57%

SRI demand

42%

Top-Line Growth

37%

Shareholder Demand
Access to capital

20%
12%

Source: Price WaterhouseCoopers 2002 Sustainability Survey Report

Figure 1. Progressive Articulation of the Caux Round Table Principles for Business

Corporate Conscience

KYOSEI and Human Dignity
CRT General Principles (7)

CRT Stakeholder Principles (6+1)

SAIP
(49 Criteria; 275
Benchmarks)
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Figure 2. The SAIP Matrix, which translates the 7 general CRT Principles and the 7
Stakeholder Principles into 49 assessment categories, containing criteria and more
detailed benchmarks.
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Exhibit 2. Cell 3.4: Criterion and Selected Benchmarks for SAIP Long Form
3.4. Owners/Investors
What level of trust has the company achieved with owners/investors? How transparent is the company to
owners/investors, and how is this transparency achieved and measured?
3.4.1

What are the company’s policies concerning:
3.4.1.1. the disclosure of information to owners/investors;
3.4.1.2. formal shareholder resolutions;
3.4.1.3. responses to inquiries, suggestions, or complaints from owners/investors…

…
3.4.3

How does the company address the following trust and transparency issues:
3.4.3.1. Preparing, auditing, and disclosing financial and operating results in accordance with
high quality standards of financial reporting and auditing;
3.4.3.2. Disclosing major share ownership and voting rights;
3.4.3.3. Revealing material foreseeable risk factors…

…
3.4.5

How does the company perform an annual audit? Describe the applicable processes, including how
an independent auditor is used to provide an external and objective assurance on the way in which
financial statements have been prepared and audited?

3.4.6

What are the company’s results with respect to third-party ratings of owner/investor relations?
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Exhibit 3. Comparison of the Baldrige Core Values and the Caux Round Table Principles
CORE VALUES BEHIND
THE BALDRIGE PROCESS

-Visionary leadership
-Customer-driven excellence
-Organizational and personal learning
-Valuing employees and partners
-Agility
-Focus on the future
-Managing for innovation
-Management by fact
-Social responsibility
-Focus on results and creating value
-Systems perspective

CRT PRINCIPLES
BEHIND THE SAIP
-Beyond shareholders toward stakeholders*
-Toward innovation, justice, and world
community
-Beyond the letter of the law toward a
spirit of trust
-Respect for rules
-Support for multilateral trade
-Respect for the environment
-Avoidance of illicit operations
*A set of principles is included that covers relations
with customers, employees, owners/investors,
suppliers, competitors, and communities.
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Figure 3. Three Stages of Engagement with the SAIP: (I) The Executive and Board
Survey, (II) the Senior Management Survey, and (III) the Long Form SAIP. Each
stage utilizes a more elaborate rendering of the criteria and benchmarks than the
one preceding.

Stage I
(see Exhibit 4)

Stage II
(see Exhibit5)

Stage III
(see Exhibit 2)
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Exhibit 4. Cell 3.4: Executive and Board Survey Gateway Criterion (SAIP Stage I)

3.4 Owners/Investors
How does the company elicit the trust of owners/investors (e.g., through responsible disclosures, timely
and complete responses to shareholder/investor inquiries, governance policies, comprehensive and
accurate external audits, etc.)?

Exhibit 5. Cell 3.4: Senior Management Survey Gateway Criterion (SAIP Stage II)

3.4 Owners/Investors
How, and to what extent, does the company elicit the trust of owners/investors (e.g., through
responsible disclosures, timely and complete responses to shareholder/investor inquiries, governance
policies, comprehensive and accurate external audits, etc.)?
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Footnotes
(a) The answers lie in three areas: decisive actions, a statement of standards with regular
audits, and appropriate incentives.
(b) The Caux Round Table Principles for Business may be viewed on the Caux Round Table’s
website (http://www.cauxroundtable.org). In language and form, the Minnesota Principles
provided the substantial basis for the Caux Principles. To obtain a copy of the Minnesota
Principles, contact the Center for Ethical Business Cultures (http://www.cebcglobal.org).
(c) The SAIP was developed by a working group of practitioners and academics, including
Harry R. Halloran, American Refining Group; T. Dean Maines, University of St. Thomas;
Charles M. Denny, ADC, Inc. (Retired); Kenneth E. Goodpaster, University of St. Thomas;
Timothy T. Greene, The Enlightened World Foundation; Lee M. Kennedy, 3M; Clinton O.
Larson, Honeywell, Inc.(Retired); and Arnold M. Weimerskirch, Honeywell, Inc. (Retired).
The SAIP is currently being translated and adapted for use in Japan and Germany. The goal is to
have 50 U.S. corporations utilizing the SAIP within one year after the
completion of beta testing.
(e) Personal communication, March 27, 2003.

